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IN THE 
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OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
S & F SUPPLY COMPANY, a Utah corpo-
ration; BURGER-IN-THE-ROUND, a Dela-
ware corporation, ANDREW W. SOUVALL, 
TOULA P. SOUVALL, his wife; PETER W. 
SOUVALL, MARY SOUVALL, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, \ Case No. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a Na- / 12686 
tional Association, 
Intervening Plaintiff-Respondent 
S. CRAIG HUNTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. ! 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiffs-respondents brought their action in the 
lower court alleging breach of contract. Intervening plain-
tiff-respondent intervened. Defendant-appellant defended 
and counterclaimed that he was induced to purchase se-
curities as a result of violations of Section 61-1-22(1) (b) 
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Marcellus K. Snow presiding, dismissed defendant-appel-
lant's counterclaims, and submitted the case to the Jury 
on the basis of special Interrogatories. Judgment was 
granted against defendant-appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant asks to have this Court reverse 
the judgment of the lower court and direct entry of judg-
ment for defendant-appellant or in the alternative, re-
mand the case for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The plaintiffs Peter and Andrew Souvall were 
the principal stockholders of plaintiffs S & F Supply 
and Burger-In-The-Round (previously named Dinner Ta-
ble) (R-13, Exhibit 9-D at P. 1). They were officers, 
directors and members of the executive committees of 
both corporations (R-26, 29, 80). 
2. John Langeland, senior vice president of the in-
tervening plaintiff, Zions First National Bank (Bank) in 
charge of commercial loans, and T. Bowering Woodbury, 
a vice president of the Bank, were both stockholders of 
S & F Supply and Burger-In-The-Round (R-83, 84, 216, 
217). They were also directors and members of active 
executive committees of both corporations (R-80, 207, 
208). Souvall testified that Langeland and Woodbury 
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were also officers of S & F Supply Co. (R-28). The 
Souvalls had obtained commercial loans from the Bank 
prior to August, 1969 (R-80-84, 223). 
3. In August, 1969, S & F Supply and Burger-In-
The-Round obtained an additional commercial loan of 
$200,000.00 from the Bank (R-36). The Souvalls person-
ally guaranteed the loan (Exhibit 9-D at P. 3). The loan 
was a Small Business Administration (SBA) loan partici-
pated in 75 percent by the SBA and 25 percent by the 
Bank (Exhibit 9-D at P. 3). Various corporate and per-
sonal assets of the plaintiffs were pledged to the Bank as 
collateral on the SBA loan (R-33-35). Among the assets 
pledged on the loan were 10,000 shares of Universal Leas-
ing stock owned by the Souvalls (R-36). Peter Souvall 
was a director of Universal Leasing Corporation (R-37). 
4. Peter Souvall testified that John Langeland and 
Donald Bennett, one of the loan officers in Langeland's 
department, assisted the Souvalls in preparing the loan 
application to the SBA (R-88). 
5. The business and financial dealings of the Bank 
officers with the Souvalls, although required to be dis-
closed, were omitted from the SBA loan application (loan 
application, R-144-148). 
6. After only one monthly payment, the SBA loan 
became in default in October, 1969 (R-92, 219). 
7. The Souvalls and the Bank officers worked to-
gether to sell the collateral to pay off the SBA loan (R-39, 
43, 52, 71, 98-102, 121, 126, 229, 236, 241, 259, 261, 710). 
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8. In February, 1970, defendant learned that the 
Universal Leasing stock held by the Bank as collateral 
on the SBA loan was for sale (R-391-394). 
Defendant contacted Donald Bennett at the Bank, 
who told defendant that he could not give him any in-
formation unless the SouvaUs authorized it (R-183, 395-
396). 
9. The defendant then contacted Peter Souvall who 
told him the Bank had all the information on Universal 
Leasing and that the SouvaUs would authorize the Bank 
to deliver whatever information the Bank had to the de-
fendant (R-183, 396). The Souvalls telephoned Bennett 
and told him to give defendant whatever information the 
Bank had on Universal Leasing (R-183, 396). 
10. Defendant then returned to the Bank and asked 
Don Bennett for the information about Universal Leasing 
(R-160, 396-397, 507). 
Bennett gave defendant one financial statement of 
Universal Leasing (Exhibit 18-D) and claims that he 
showed defendant two other financial statements (Ex-
hibits 13-P & 14-P) (R-153, 160, 397, 398, 667). 
Defendant denies that Bennett showed him anything 
except one financial statement (R-507). Defendant claims 
that Bennett, after giving defendant one financial state-
ment, said "That is all the information we have" (R-513). 
11. At the time of defendant's visit with Bennett, 
Universal Leasing was in serious financial difficulty (P-
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604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 617, 618). Both Lange-
land and Bennett knew of the serious financial difficulty 
of Universal Leasing (R-151-153, 672-673). 
12. Defendant did not know at the time of the sign-
ing of the contract on March 9, 1970, that Universal Leas-
ing was in serious financial difficulty (R-397-403). 
13. On February 27, 1970, Bennett learned from the 
President of Universal Leasing that at least one Universal 
Leasing financial statement he claimed to have had was 
false (Exhibit 15-P). Bennett admitted he did not in-
form defendant of this fact (R-184-186, 663). 
14. Defendant agreed to purchase the stock held 
by the Bank and was to act as a conduit for the sale of the 
other assets held as collateral which were sold or to be 
sold to other persons (R-48, 98-103). The Bank and the 
Souvalls had already arranged for Ernie Psarras to pur-
chase some of the assets (R-98-104, 244-245). Peter Sou-
vall was to help sell the remaining assets (R-71, 102). 
All receipts from the sale of the assets were to be de-
livered to the Bank to apply to the SBA loan (R-70-71, 
399-400). The Bank approved and signed the contract 
for the sale of stock to defendant (R-261). 
15. Certain of the SBA collateral assets were in fact 
channeled back to the Souvalls and to the SouvalPs at-
torney (R-57-58). 
16. Both the contract with the defendant and the 
contract with Psarras were executed on March 9, 1970 
(R-101, 537). Bennett delivered the Universal Leasing 
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stock to defendant and did not require a promissory note. 
Bennett admitted that this was a very unusual transac-
tion for the Bank to make (R-135). The SouvalTs at-
torney stated at trial that plaintiffs wanted to consum-
mate the sale to defendant by "hook or by crook" (R-
742). 
17. Approximately six weeks after the signing of the 
contract, Bennett approached Hunter and requested Hun-
ter to sign a promissory note in the amount of $133,500.00 
as an accommodation to Bennett to satisfy the Bank ex-
aminers, which Hunter signed (R-402). 
Bennett assured Hunter that he would in no way be 
obligated on the note and that it was not intended to 
evidence a separate obligation of Hunter (R-402). 
18. In the summer of 1970, defendant discovered 
that Universal Leasing was financially broke, and had 
been in serious financial difficulty since the fall of 1969. 
He later discovered that the Bank's officers were deeply 
involved with the plaintiffs and had known that Universal 
Leasing was in serious financial difficulty when the Bank 
delivered him the stock (R-402-403). 
19. Defendant tendered back to the Bank stock com-
parable to 10,000 shares of Universal Leasing (R-156,164, 
522). 
20. In defendant's pleadings and also at trial defen-
dant raised the issue of whether the Bank was the agent 
of the plaintiff, for the giving of information to defendant, 
about Universal Leasing (See Argument Point I ) . 
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21. Counsel for plaintiffs inquired extensively re-
garding Exhibit 7-D, the SBA loan application, in direct 
testimony of their witnesses, before counsel for defendant 
ever inquired about Exhibit 7-D (R-31-36). Counsel for 
defendant offered Exhibit 7-D, the SBA loan application, 
into evidence (R-85-87). The Judge sustained an objec-
tion on the basis of immateriality and irrelevancy (R-90-
91). At least twice again during the course of the trial, 
both in chambers and at the bench, Exhibit 7-D was re-
offered. 
22. The Court refused to give an instruction on the 
agency of the Bank and permitted the case to go to the 
Jury on the basis of special interrogatories propounded 
by counsel for plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE 
BANK WAS THE AGENT OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS FOR THE GIVING OF INFORMA-
TION ABOUT UNIVERSAL LEASING TO 
THE DEFENDANT, AND FURTHER THAT 
A PRINCIPAL IS LIABLE FOR THE ACTS 
AND OMISSIONS OF ITS AGENT ACTING 
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THAT AGENCY. 
Defendant alleged in his Answer to the Bank's Com-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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plaint that the officers of the Bank were "intimately in-
volved as officers and/or agents in other business ventures 
involving the other plaintiffs and the Souvalls, . . . and 
[that] said officers were working with and assisting the 
said Souvalls and were trying to induce defendant to pur-
chase said stock . . ." (R-55-56). The testimony is uncon-
tested that the Bank conveyed the financial information 
regarding Universal Leasing to defendant only upon the 
Souvall's specific instruction. The testimony is as follows: 
Testimony of Bank Officer, DON BENNETT; 
CROSS-EXAMINATION by Mr. Faber: 
Q. Did the Souvalls tell you that he [defen-
dant] talked to them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In fact they told you to give him what-
ever information the Bank had. Isn't that correct? 
A. Yes (R-183). 
Testimony of Defendant; 
DIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Faber: 
Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. 
Bennett? 
A. At that time he just told me that I should 
go out and see the Souvalls, that I would have to 
discuss it with them first, and that he couldn't 
give me any information unless they authorized it. 
Q. Did you go to see the Souvalls? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when did that meeting take place? 
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A. It was either, it was right in that same 
two or three day period. I don't remember if it 
was the same day or the next day or — it was right 
shortly after I talked to Don Bennett anyway. 
Q. Did you talk to the Souvalls? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did they tell you? 
A. They told me that I would have to go get 
any information that I wanted on the stock, out-
side of the fact they were willing to sell it, from 
the bank. 
Q. Did they tell you that they would author-
ize the bank to release that information to you? 
A. Yes. Called over to the bank and did 
that. 
Q. Did you then go back to the bank? 
A. Yes (R-345-346). 
Testimony of Defendant; 
CROSS-EXAMINATION by Mr. Nebeker: 
Q. Now when you went to the Souvalls and 
had your discussion with them about buying this 
stock, did you ask them to furnish any current 
financial statements? 
A. When I asked the Souvalls for informa-
tion on the stock, they sent me to the Bank. When 
I got to the Bank, I saw Don Bennett. He gave 
me a financial statement and told me that was all 
the information that they had on it . . . (R-507). 
From the testimony, it is clear that the Souvalls 
authorized the Bank to convey the information about 
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Universal Leasing to defendant. It is also clear that the 
Bank only acted as a result of that authorization. Under 
such circumstances, defendant was absolutely entitled 
to an instruction directing the jury to determine whether 
the Bank was the agent of the Souvalls for giving infor-
mation about Universal Leasing to defendant. Because 
of the close business association between the Bank's offi-
cers and the plaintiffs, and because of defendant's claim 
that the Bank and the Souvalls failed to give him certain 
critical information about Universal Leasing, it was im-
possible for defendant to fairly present his defense to the 
Jury unless the Jury was instructed on the question of 
agency. 
The applicable statute holds the principal (a seller 
of securities) and his agent jointly liable. § 61-1-22(1) (b) 
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act states: 
"Any person who . . . offers or sells a security by 
means of any untrue statement of a material fact 
or any omission to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they are made, 
not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the un-
truth or omission), and who does not sustain the 
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, 
of the untruth or omission, is liable to the person 
buying the security from him, . . . Every agent 
who materially aids in the sale is also liable jointly 
and severally with and to the same extent as the 
seller, unless the nonseller who is so liable sustains 
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, 
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of the existence of the facts by reason of which 
the liability is alleged to exist . . ." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The testimony in this case is that the Bank had ex-
press authority from the Souvalls to divulge to the de-
fendant whatever financial information the Bank had 
about Universal Leasing. The Bank only acted pursuant 
to that authority. The statute is clear that both the agent 
and his principal are jointly liable for material omissions 
by the agent. Defendant requested and was clearly en-
titled to an instruction on agency. The Jury should have 
been instructed as to the legal binding effect of the acts 
of the agent upon the principal. Failure to give these in-
structions to the Jury denied the defendant the right to 
have the Jury (1) find that the plaintiffs, the Souvalls, 
were liable under the Utah Securities statute for the acts 
and omissions of intervening plaintiff, Zions First Na-
tional Bank, and (2) find that the Bank was liable for 
misconduct under the Securities statute and chargeable 
thereunder as the agent of the Souvalls. 
In addition, the general law of agency is that a cor-
poration may act as an agent for an individual principal 
or for another corporation. 3 Am. Jur. 2nd, "Agency", 
§ 13 at page 427. Furthermore, the agency and the assent 
of the parties thereto may be either expressed or implied. 
3 Am. Jur. 2nd, "Agency", § 18, at page 428. By the tes-
timony, agency here was express (R-183). So far as con-
cerns a third person dealing with an agent, the agent's 
scope of authority includes not only the actual authoriza-
tion conferred upon the agent by the principal, but also 
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that which has apparently been delegated to him. Wood 
v. Strevell-Paterson Hardware Co., 6 Utah 2nd 340, 313 
P. 2d 800 (1957), cited at 3 Am. Jur. 2nd, "Agency", § 73, 
at page 475. A principal is responsible for injury resulting 
from the fraud of his agent committed during the exist-
ence of the agency and within the scope of the agent's 
actual or apparent authority. An agent does not cease 
to act within the course of his employment merely because 
he engages in a fraud upon a third person. 37 Am. Jur. 
2nd, "Fraud and Deceit", § 311, at pages 411-412. Clearly 
the defendant was entitled to an instruction on agency as 
he requested. 
POINT II. 
SUBSTANTIAL AND PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR WAS COMMITTED BY THE LOWER 
COURT IN EXCLUDING FROM THE EVI-
DENCE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED EX-
HIBIT 7-D, ENTITLED "SBA LOAN APPLI-
CATION". 
The evidence was that the plaintiffs and the Bank 
officers were working together to liquidate the SBA loan 
and that both the plaintiffs and the Bank signed the con-
tract of sale to defendant of the Universal Leasing stock 
pledged on the SBA loan (See Fact No. 7, STATEMENT 
OF FACTS; R-241). Defendant alleged that he was not 
told certain critical facts about Universal Leasing Cor-
poration, which facts were in possession of the Bank, and 
was not told that plaintiffs and the Bank officers were 
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working together to have defendant purchase the said 
stock (See R-151, 153, 550, 398, 673). Evidence support-
ing such claim was material to defendant's presentation 
of his defense. The SBA loan application shows the sub-
stantial involvement of the plaintiffs and the Bank officers 
in their common cause to have defendant pay off the loan. 
Moreover, the SBA loan application is admissible on 
several grounds: 
1. Counsel for plaintiffs examined witnesses con-
cerning the SBA loan application prior to any mention of 
the same by defendant (R-31-36). It is an undisputed 
rule of law that if a party opens the door by inquiring 
into a particular matter, he is estopped from thereafter 
shutting the door to that inquiry by the opposing party. 
McCormick on Evidence states that " . . . one who induces 
a trial court to let down the bars to a field of inquiry that 
is not competent or relevant to the issues cannot complain 
if his adversary is also allowed to avail himself of the 
opening." McCormick on Evidence, Chapter 6, § 57, p. 
132. 
Counsel for both plaintiffs and the Bank opened the 
subject of the SBA loan in their opening statements (R-
13, 16-17). Counsel for the plaintiffs inquired extensively 
and in detail regarding the loan application, its prepara-
tion, the assets listed on the application as security for 
the loan, and the filing of the application, prior to the 
offer into evidence of the application by defendant's coun-
sel (R-31-36). Even if the SBA loan application was in-
competent or irrelevant, plaintiffs and the Bank should 
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be estopped on this ground alone from objecting to its 
admission. 
2. The SBA loan application is relevant and material 
to show the relationship between the plaintiff and the 
Bank officers and that they had common cause in induc-
ing the defendant to enter the transaction with the Sou-
vails. 
Defendant alleged in its "Answer to Intervenor's 
Complaint & Counterclaim", that 
" . . . the officers of and acting for intervening plain-
tiff, Zions First National Bank, who dealt with 
defendant on or about February 17, 1970, . . . were 
intimately involved as officers and/or agents in 
other business ventures involving the other plain-
tiff and the Souvalls . . . that said officers were 
working with and assisting said Souvalls and were 
trying to induce defendant to purchase stock to 
aid said Souvalls and so that intervenor's loan 
would be paid back by defendant purchasing said 
stock, which said stock said officers knew to be 
worthless" (R-55-56). 
Numerous pertinent and material facts required to 
be disclosed in the SBA loan application were either 
omitted completely or misstated. Said omissions are ma-
terial and relevant to defendant's defense and counter-
claim of fraud in that they establish a connection and 
association between the plaintiffs and the Bank officers 
and create strong and substantial inferences that both 
plaintiffs and the Bank officers worked together in a 
scheme or artifice or plan to dispose of the collateral of 
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the SBA loan to defendant by "hook or by crook" (as 
counsel for plaintiff stated (R-742)), to protect their 
mutual business interests and to prevent the misstate-
ments and omissions of the SBA loan application of Din-
ner Table and S & F Supply from being brought to light. 
The omissions and misstatements were numerous, but the 
following are sufficiently demonstrative: 
ITEM TWO of "Applicant's Statement" of the SBA 
loan application requires the declaration of all who as-
sisted in the preparation of the application (Exhibit 7-D). 
Mr. Souvall testified that both Mr. John Langeland and 
Donald Bennett of the Bank assisted in the preparation 
of the loan application. Their participation was not dis-
closed (R-88). ITEM THREE requires the disclosure of 
officers and directors, etc., of the applicants (Exhibit 
7-D). T. Bowering Woodbury, Vice-President of the 
Bank, and Mr. John Langeland, Senior Vice-President 
of the Bank, were stockholders, directors and members 
of the Executive Committees of both the Dinner Table 
and S & F Supply (R-28, 80, 83-84). None of these facts 
were disclosed as required (R-144-145, Exhibit 7-D). 
ITEM EIGHT of the SBA loan application requires the 
disclosure of the use of the loan proceeds (Exhibit 7-D). 
It was not disclosed that substantial amounts of the loan 
proceeds went to pay off other personal and commercial 
loans with the Bank (R-148). 
These omissions show the inner involvement of plain-
tiffs and the Bank officers and indicate a mutual interest 
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in working together to dispose of the assets by "hook or by 
crook", to defendant. 
3. The assets pledged under the SBA loan applica-
tion are the same assets which the Souvalls were claiming 
that defendant bought, and the said application would be 
material and relevant to establish the identity and value 
of said assets. Furthermore, the misstatements and omis-
sions clearly demonstrate the propensity and capacity of 
both plaintiffs and intervening plaintiff to misstate and 
omit material facts and thus the document should have 
been admitted to impeach the testimony of the plaintiff 
Peter Souvall and the officers of the Bank. 
It is a clear rule of evidence particularly in Utah that 
"whatever to the ordinary reasoning mind is logically pro-
bative of a fact in issue is prima facie admissible and 
should not be excluded unless its admission violates a rule 
of law or policy. 29 Am. Jur. 2nd, "Evidence", § 251; 
Thiede v. Utah, 159 U. S. 510, 40 L. Ed. 237, 16 S. Ct. 62 
(1895). Objections upon the ground of irrelevancy are 
not favored for the reason that the force and effect of 
circumstantial facts usually and almost necessarily de-
pend upon their connection with each other. Moore v. 
United States, 150 U. S. 57, 37 L. Ed. 996, 14 S, Ct. 26 
(1893). 
It is therefore submitted that Exhibit 7-D of the SBA 
loan application was wrongfully excluded from evidence 
for the reason that where the plaintiffs inquired into the 
subject of the loan application they should be estopped 
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from denying defendant from further examination regard-
ing it. Plaintiffs' objection based on immateriality and 
irrelevancy is clearly without merit. The application dem-
onstrates the connection and common cause between 
plaintiffs and the Bank's officers to have defendant 
charged with the purchase of the collateral assets. The 
loan application lists the assets which are the subject of 
this dispute and places values on each. Furthermore, it 
impeaches the testimony of plaintiffs and the Bank's 
officers and demonstrates their propensity and capacity 
to misstate or omit material facts. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
NUMBER 17 AND 19 WHEN IT FAILED TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT LIABILITY 
UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURI-
TIES ACT CAN BE PREDICATED UPON 
AN OMISSION AS OPPOSED TO A MERE 
HALF-TRUTH. 
Section 61-1-22(1) (b) of the Utah Uniform Securi-
ties Act states as follows: 
Any person who offers or sells a security by 
means of an untrue statement of material fact or 
omission to state a material fact necessary in or-
der to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances in which they are made, not mis-
leading, . . . is liable to the person buying the se-
curity from him who may sue either at law or at 
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equity to recover the consideration paid for the 
securities, . . . (Emphasis added.) 
In addition to the clear language of the statute con-
cerning omissions, cases construing identical language of 
Federal law have made it clear that liability can be predi-
cated upon a failure to disclose even where no represen-
tations at all are involved. See Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 69 F. Supp. 112 (EDPA 1946), where the essence 
of the complaint was the failure of the Buyer to disclose 
to the Seller certain corporate facts known only to the 
Buyer, which, if had been divulged to the Seller would 
have resulted in a totally different situation. In Speed 
v. Transarnerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (1951), recovery 
was granted because of non-disclosure. Also see S.E.C. 
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262 (1968); see 
Gadsby, Business Organizations, Volume 11-A, § 5.03-
(1) (b) for an analysis of the development of the law in 
this area. If there was liability only for false statements 
and half-truths and not for omissions, then the law would 
place a premium on taciturnity. (Gadsby, Page 5-15.) 
Gadsby concludes that, "the Courts, in applying Rule 
10(b) 5, [the language of which is the same as the lan-
guage in the Utah Securities statute] have merely substi-
tuted for the requirement of scienter, the requirements 
of the rule itself; that is that the representation made by 
the defendant be false or that he stood silent when he 
should have spoken." (Gadsby, Page 5-32). 
In the instant case, the lower court cited the statute 
and then stated that the statute related to misstatements 
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of fact and half-truths. The statute itself clearly states 
"omissions". On that basis alone the lower court's instruc-
tions are in error and clearly confusing, and may have 
tended to mislead the Jury. In addition, the word "half-
truth" is not used in the statute and is not an accurate 
statement of the reasonable reading of the statute itself 
as the cases construing similar language in the Federal 
law have demonstrated. 
The evidence is that the Bank's officer, Donald 
Bennett, knew that one financial statement of Universal 
Leasing was false, and he admitted he did not tell defen-
dant (Exhibit 15-P, R-184-186, 663). The Bank officers 
also knew that Universal Leasing was in poor financial 
condition and did not tell defendant (R-151, 153, 673, 398-
400). Defendant was entitled to have the Jury consider 
these omissions as violations of the Utah Securities Stat-
ute. The lower court's interpretation of the statute de-
nied defendant this opportunity. 
Furthermore, inasmuch as the Utah Statute is a re-
cission statute and does not allow the Buyer to sue for 
his expectation interest as does the federal rule, the 
rationale for the Federal interpretation should be even 
more rigorously applied to the Utah statute. 
If the law were to be as the lower court set it forth 
in the last paragraph of Instruction 17, then all one need 
do to avoid liability under the statute would be to remain 
absolutely silent. This Court has expressed its opinion 
against this position in regards to common law fraud. See 
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Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P. 2d 802 (1963). 
The language of the statute itself as well as Federal case 
law dictate that material omissions are actionable under 
Section 61-1-22(1) (b). 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR WHEN IT I M P R O P E R L Y I N -
STRUCTED THE JURY CONCERNING DE-
FENDANT'S STATUTORY DEFENSE AND 
CONCERNING THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
FIRST: The defendant's defense of statutory fraud 
against the plaintiffs and the Bank under Section 61-1-
22(1) (b) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act was com-
pletely removed from the consideration of the Jury by 
the court's erroneous instructions. Even though the Sou-
valls omitted to reveal material facts to the defendant 
about the financial condition of Universal Leasing, the 
Jury was prevented from finding that the Souvalls were 
liable under the statute because the court's instruction 
did not allow them to consider omissions (see Argument 
Point II above) (R-441). 
The Jury was prevented from finding that the plain-
tiffs were liable for the conduct of the Bank officers, or 
that there may have existed a device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud, because the court refused to give an instruc-
tion on agency (see Argument Point I ) , and because the 
instructions and the interrogatories to the Jury com-
pletely separated defendant's defense against the plain-
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tiffs from defendant's defense against the Bank (See In-
structions 14, 18, 20, 31 and Interrogatories 11-25). Fur-
ther, the court denied the defendant the right to amend 
the pleadings for a separate statutory fraud action and 
defense against the Bank. 
The consequence of the foregoing is that all the Jury 
could possibly find in defendant's favor was a common-
law fraud defense against the Bank. Defendant was de-
nied his defense of statutory fraud against plaintiffs and 
the Bank. 
Defendant pleaded in his answer to intervenor's com-
plaint and counterclaim dated December 30, 1970, that 
the officers of Zions First National Bank who dealt with 
defendant on or about February 17, 1970, were "inti-
mately involved as officers and/or agents in other busi-
ness ventures involving the other plaintiff and the Sou-
valls mentioned in intervenor's complaint . . ." and, ". . . 
that the said officers were working with and assisting the 
said Souvalls and were trying to induce defendant to pur-
chase said stock . . .". The evidence in the instant case 
was clearly to the effect that the Bank was the agent of 
the Souvalls (see Argument Point I above), and there-
fore liable under statutory fraud as their agent. 
In addition to the possibility of liability of the Bank 
as agent, defendant was entitled to a separate claim and 
defense against the Bank based on statutory fraud under 
Section 61-1-22(1) (b). After the evidence was in, defen-
dant's counsel raised Rule 15b of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
Procedure to allow an independent claim against the Bank 
of statutory fraud under Section 61-1-22. Rule 15b pro-
vides as follows: 
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, 
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of 
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause and 
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial on these 
issues . , . " 
Defendant is entitled under the statute to a sepa-
rate claim and defense against the Bank not involving its 
agency. In omitting to give material information to de-
fendant the Bank was acting on its own behalf as well 
as for plaintiffs. The misrepresentations and non-disclos-
ures in question under the statute were clearly those of 
the Bank, as well as the Souvalls. 
SECOND: Instructions 17, 18 and 21 are erroneous 
in that they incorrectly state the burden and elements of 
proof under the statute. 
Instruction 17 places the burden upon the defendant 
to show under statutory fraud that plaintiffs "knowingly 
and willfully and with intent that defendant rely thereon 
and be deceived thereby induced defendant to purchase" 
(emphasis added), by an untrue material fact or half-
truth. 
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Not only is the instruction erroneous in the use of 
the term "half-truth", but such a statement of the burden 
of proof is certainly in error under Section 61-1-22(1) (b) 
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. The statute only 
requires that the defendant ". . . not have known of the 
untruth or omission . . ." Nowhere does the statute re-
quire defendant to show scienter, intent to deceive, re-
liance, or inducement. In Steven v. Vowells, 343 F. 2nd 
374, at 379 (10th Cir. 1965), a case arising under Rule 
10b5 of the Securities and Exchange Commissions Act of 
1934, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals specifically held 
that "it is not necessary to allege or prove common law 
fraud to make out a case under the statute and rule. It 
is only necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions 
such as a material misstatement of fact or the omission 
to state a material fact." The court's instruction requires 
defendant to show common law fraud under the statute 
which is clearly erroneous. 
Under Instruction 18, defendant should not be bound 
by the elements of the burden of proof of common law 
fraud in his action against intervening plaintiff for the 
reasons stated in paragraph FIRST above. 
Furthermore, Instruction 21, by creating a presump-
tion that men are fair and honest in their dealings until 
the contrary is clearly and convincingly proven by the 
evidence to the contrary, conflicts with Instruction 31 
which states that defendant must prove his defense 
against plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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THIRD: The interrogatories which plaintiffs and 
the Bank proposed to be submitted to the Jury in numer-
ous instances were so phrased as to ask questions of fact 
and questions of law in the same interrogatory denying 
the Jury the right to make a separate judgment on each. 
One such example will demonstrate: Interrogatory No. 
3 asks: "Do you find that the defendant, S. Craig Hunter, 
in order to induce the Bank to deliver stock, made a rep-
resentation of a material fact?" 
This single interrogatory asks the following ques-
tions: 
1. Did defendant make a representation? 
2. Was it material? 
3. Was it made with intent to induce? 
To a jury unschooled in the consequences of the law, 
which of those three questions did they answer when they 
answered Interrogatory No. 3. 
Interrogatories 17 through 25 have to do with defen-
dant's defense of fraud against the plaintiffs based upon 
Section 61-1-22. Instructions 17 and 19 are repetitious in 
that twice the Jury is asked whether it finds that the 
plaintiffs made a representation of material fact to the 
defendant. 
Following Interrogatories 11-16, which cover the ele-
ments of common law fraud against the Bank, the Jury 
is instructed that, "The burden is upon defendant to prove 
each of the foregoing interrogatories by clear and con-
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vlneing evidence.5' A similar sentence follows Interroga-
tories 1-10, informing the Jury that the plaintiffs and in-
tervener carried the burden of proving all the elements 
of common law fraud against the defendant by "clear and 
convincing evidence." 
No such explanation of the burden of proof under 
Section 61-1-22 follows Interrogatories 17 through 25. 
Consequently, the Jury may have presumed that defen-
dant's burden under the statute was "clear and convinc-
ing" rather than "a preponderance of the evidence." 
Interrogatory 21 states, "Do you find that plaintiff 
knew or should have known that Universal Leasing, Ltd. 
was in very serious financial difficulty in February and 
March of 1970?" In its context, and in the absence of an 
explanation regarding the burden of proof of this point, 
the Jury likely presumed that defendant carried the bur-
den of proving this point when in fact plaintiffs carried 
that burden as per the statute. Under the statute the 
plaintiffs carry the burden of proving that they did not 
or in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known 
that Universal Leasing was in serious financial difficulty. 
Interrogatory No. 22 is not material to defendant's 
statutory defense of fraud. Defendant does not have to 
show that plaintiffs in February and March of 1970 ex-
pected the stock of Universal Leasing, Ltd. to become 
valueless within a short period of time. Its inclusion only 
confuses the Jury further as to what must be shown un-
der statutory fraud. 
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Instruction No. 23 states, "Do you find that the de-
fendant agreed to purchase the stock of Universal Leas-
ing, Ltd. as a result of Plaintiffs' device, scheme, and arti-
fice to defraud the defendant?" (Emphasis added.) For 
the first time in the instructions and interrogatories the 
term "device, scheme and artifice to defraud" is used in 
lieu of "misstatement, or omission." 
There is no instruction explaining that under the 
statute, a material misstatement or omission may consti-
tute a "device, scheme and artifice" to defraud. The Jury 
had no way of knowing that a material misstatement or 
omission may constitute a device, scheme or artifice to 
defraud. By the inclusion of the conjunction "and", pre-
sumably defendant must prove all three. 
Interrogatory No. 24 is repetitious of Interrogatory 
No. 21, and from its context it appears that defendant 
carried the burden of proving it, which is clearly not the 
case under the statute. 
Interrogatory No. 25 is wholly immaterial to defen-
dant's defense of statutory fraud and should not have 
been included in the Interrogatories. Its inclusion is only 
confusing to the Jury. 
Based on the error and unfairness that so extensively 
affect the instructions and the interrogatories, there is 
no way defendant's defense could be fairly submitted to 
the Jury. 
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POINT V. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
E R R O R IN DISMISSING DEFENDANT'S 
COUNTERCLAIMS FOR FRAUD AGAINST 
T H E PLAINTIFFS AND INTERVENING 
PLAINTIFFS UPON THE BASIS THAT "NO 
PROOF OF GENERAL DAMAGES OR PUN-
ITIVE DAMAGES WERE SHOWN." 
Damages in this case are calculated according to Sec-
tion 61-1-22(1) (b) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
The statute is clearly a recission statute granting to 
a purchaser of stock so harmed under the statute the 
right to rescind and receive his restitution interest which 
is the amount paid for the stock. Or, if the stock has 
been sold, he may calculate his restitution interest by de-
ducting from the amount paid, the amount received upon 
the sale of the stock and sue for the difference plus in-
terest. 
Defendant tendered back the equivalent of 10,000 
shares of Universal Leasing stock (R-156). The stock 
taken out was lettered and the stock tendered back was 
lettered, hence plaintiff and intervening plaintiff are put 
in the same position they were before the sale (R-156). 
Mr. Hunter testified he paid $9,000.00 for the stock 
which constitutes damages under the statute (R-402). 
He is entitled to an instruction to the Jury to that effect. 
Defendant did not plead a set off. He pleaded statutory 
fraud and damages thereunder (R-55-56). Without his 
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counterclaims he is materially harmed in that he is not 
allowed the right to seek a restitution of the considera-
tion which he paid for the worthless stock. 
Even though the lower court dismissed defendant's 
counterclaims on the grounds of a failure to show dam-
ages, neither counsel for plaintiff nor counsel for inter-
vening plaintiff ever asserted in their arguments for dis-
missal that no damages were shown by defendant (R-
725-761). In fact, counsel for intervening plaintiff ad-
mitted in his argument for dismissal that, "The facts are 
in dispute..." (R-731). 
The established rule in Utah requires the trial court 
to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party against whom the motion for dismissal is directed 
and must resolve every controverted fact in his favor. 
Boskovich v. Utah Construction Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 
P. 2d 885, 887 (1953). It is not within the province of 
the lower court to weigh or determine the preponderance 
of the evidence when determining a motion to dismiss. 
Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P. 2d 491 (1952). 
Defendant submitted evidence as to amounts paid for the 
stock. Where counsel for the Bank admits that the facts 
are in dispute, defendant is clearly entitled to an instruc-
tion, and Jury consideration of his counterclaims, and if 
the Jury finds misconduct under the statute, to a resti-
tution of the amounts paid for the stock. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER P. FABER, JR. 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
JOHN TAFT BENSON 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Appellant 
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